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This paper studies the interaction between public and private health care provision in a 
National Health Service (NHS), with free public care and costly private care. The health 
authority decides whether or not to allow private provision and sets the public sector 
remuneration. The physicians allocate their time (effort) in the public and (if allowed) in the 
private sector based on the public wage income and the private sector profits. We show that 
allowing physician dual practice "crowds out" public provision, and results in lower overall 
health care provision. While the health authority can mitigate this effect by offering a higher 
wage, we find that a ban on dual practice is more efficient if private sector competition is 
weak and public and private care are sufficiently close substitutes. On the other hand, if 
private sector competition is sufficiently hard, a mixed system, with physician dual practice, 
is always preferable to a pure NHS system. 
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Most health care systems involve a mixture of public and private provision. However, as pointed
out by Besley and Gouveia [1], in National Health Service (NHS) systems the role for private
health care is diﬀerent and more limited compared with private and mixed health care systems.
In a NHS, health care is mainly provided publicly and ﬁnanced by general taxation. Still, in
most countries with a NHS system there exist a parallel (and growing) private sector alongside
the public one.1
In a NHS, the physicians therefore have the opportunity to work in the private sector — a
phenomenon typically referred to as physician dual practice. Interestingly, we observe that a
substantial share of the physicians spend time in both sectors. For instance, in the UK most
private medical services are provided by physicians whose main commitment is to the NHS. The
UK Monopolies and Merger Commission [3] estimated that about 61% of the NHS consultants
had signiﬁcant private work. According to Johnson [4], physician dual practice is common in
many countries like, for instance, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries.
In this paper, we analyse the interaction between public and private health care provision
in a NHS system, where publicly employed physicians may work in the private sector. Notably,
physician dual practice introduces close links between the public and the private sector on both
the demand and the supply side. In particular, physicians may shift patients seeking public care
to their private practice, and they can allocate their labour supply according to which sector that
provides the higher beneﬁt.2 While there exists some literature on the interaction between public
and private health care provision, the issue of physician dual practice has received surprisingly
little attention, despite being a common phenomenon. The purpose of this paper is to help ﬁll
this gap in the literature.
When analysing public and private health care provision in the presence of physician dual
practice, we address the following questions: How does the private option for NHS physicians
aﬀect their public sector labour supply and the public provision of health care? What role does
competition among physicians play for public and private health care provision? Finally, is a
mixed health care system always desirable, or should the health authority enforce a pure NHS
1In the UK, for instance, Propper [2] reports that private health care expenditures have increased from 9% of
total health care expenditures in 1979 to 15% in 1995.
2This activity is sometimes labeled moonlighting. A recent newsletter from the Health Economics & Financing
Programme at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine reported on the importance of ”moonlighting
physicians”. See Exchange Summer 2003.
2system by not allowing physician dual practice?
To analyse these questions, we consider a health care market characterised as a NHS, where
public (in-plan) health care is free of any charges at the point of consumption, while patients
seeking private (out-of-plan) care are charged a payment. In this market there is a health
authority (e.g., the Ministry of Health) responsible for providing health care to individuals in
need for medical treatment. The health authority decides whether or not to allow private (out-of-
plan) provision of health care alongside the NHS, and determines the public sector remuneration
(wage level).3
The provision of health care is very labour-intensive, implying that the physicians’ labour
supply in the two sectors are important for the amount of public and private health care that
will be provided. In the public sector, the physicians’ are on salary, while in the private sector
they earn proﬁts. Thus, the physicians’ allocation of time between the two sectors will depend
on the public sector wage income and the private sector proﬁts. On the demand side, we
assume that public and private care are (horizontally) diﬀerentiated products, reﬂecting diﬀerent
service mixes, specialisations, treatment methods, etc.4 The degree of diﬀerentiation can also
be interpreted in geographical terms, reﬂecting physical distance between the hospitals and the
patients. The fact that public health care is free, while private health care is charged a price,
implies that most patients prefer to be taken care of in the public sector. We show that public
rationing always takes place in our model.5
Allowing physicians to oﬀer (substitutable) private services outside the NHS system may
have several potential eﬀects on the provision of public health care. In this paper, we show
that the private option imposes a crowding-out eﬀect — not only on the public provision — but
in fact on overall health care provision. Since the price of private care is decreasing in the
public sector capacity, as well as the private sector supply, the physicians have an incentive to
restrict their labour supply in both sectors. This is a standard market power incentive due to
imperfect competition in the private sector. The strength of this incentive, obviously, depends
on the number of physicians in the market and the degree of substitutability between public and
3We also observe that Health Authorities sometimes impose restrictions on the private earnings of the publicly
employed physicians. In the UK, for instance, full-time NHS consultants are not allowed to earn more than 10%
of their NHS salary on their private practice. This issue is analysed by González [5].
4The empirical study by McAvinchey and Yannopoulos [6] shows that public and private health care in the
UK NHS system are (imperfect) substitutes.
5We do not explicitly model waiting time in the NHS system. There are some papers that considers the eﬀect
of private health care provision on the waiting list in the public sector [7 − 9]. However, neither of these papers
deals with physician dual practice and the incentive to shift patients from the public to the private sector.
3private health care.
The health authority can mitigate the crowding out eﬀect by oﬀering a higher public sector
wage. However, since this increases the public expenditures, a ban on physician dual practice
may be a more eﬃcient policy. We show that this is the case if the number of physicians in the
market is low and public and private health care are suﬃciently close substitutes. In this case
private sector competition is weak and the crowding out eﬀect strong, resulting in a substantial
eﬃciency loss in the private sector and a concern for undersupply of public health care. On the
other hand, we show that a mixed public-private health care system is always beneﬁcial if the
number of physicians is suﬃciently high. However, the scope for a private (out-of-plan) option
alongside the NHS is decreasing in the weight the health authority attaches to the patients’ health
beneﬁtr e l a t i v et op h y s i c i a np r o ﬁts. In the extreme case, where the health authority is concerned
about maximising patients’ health beneﬁt net of public and private medical expenditures only,
there is a strong bias towards a large public sector.
This paper relates to the literature on public and private health care markets in general.6 A
common assumption in these studies is that public and private providers are separate entities.
Our paper departs from this literature in that we allow physicians to work in both sectors.
Obviously, this substantially changes the physicians’ incentives to provide public and private
care, as there are now close links between the two sectors on both the demand and the supply
side. As a consequence, welfare and policy implications are qualitatively diﬀerent.
The literature on physician dual practice in mixed health care markets is, as mentioned
above, rather limited but growing. A related paper is Rickman and McGuire [13]. Building
on the model by Ellis and McGuire [14], they study the optimal public reimbursement cost
sharing rule when a physician can provide both public and private services (which may be either
substitutes or complements). Their focus and modelling approach diﬀer from ours in several
aspects. In Rickman and McGuire, physicians do not receive wage income in the public sector,
but instead a share of the public hospital’s proﬁts (revenues), which establishes the link to
the reimbursement system. Thus, public sector remuneration is not a part of their analysis.
Moreover, they assume private sector monopoly, implying that the degree of competition plays
no role in their analysis. Finally, they do not address the issue of whether or not physician dual
6Some relevant papers are Barros and Martinez-Giralt [10] who analyse the the eﬀect of diﬀerent reimbursement
rules on quality and cost eﬃciency; Jofre-Bonet [11] who analyses the interaction between public and private
providers when consumers diﬀer in income, and Marchand and Schroyen [12] who analyse the desirability of
mixed health care systems when distributional aspects matters.
4practice should be banned.
In addition, there are four other papers applying a principal-agent framework to analyse
eﬀects of physician dual practice [5,15 − 17]. These papers focus on potential moral hazard
problems in the public provision that may arise due to the physicians’ private activities. Gonzalez
[5] presents a model where a physician has an incentive to provide excessive quality in the
public sector to raise her prestige in the private sector, and focuses on the policy issue of
whether or not physician dual practice should be restricted. Barros and Olivella [15] analyse a
model with waiting list in the public sector and study a physician’s decision to cream-skim. A
similar approach is taken by Gonzalez [16], who focuses on diﬀerent systems for remunerating
the physician in the two sectors. Finally, Biglaiser and Ma [17] consider quality incentives of
physician dual practice in a model with no explicit incentives in the public sector and two types
of physicians; dedicated doctors and moonlighters, where the latter type shifts patients to their
private practice if this is beneﬁcial. As none of these studies are concerned with physicians’
labour supply nor the role of private sector competition, they diﬀer substantially from ours.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we derive
and characterise the physicians’ labour supply in the public and the private for a given public
sector remuneration (wage). In Section 4 we analyse the optimal wage setting by the health
authority. In section 5 we analyse the health authority’s decision of whether or not to allow
physician dual practice. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2M o d e l
We consider a health care market characterised as a National Health Service (NHS) with health
care being provided by public hospitals free of any charges at the point of consumption. In
this market there are three diﬀerent agents: First, there is a health authority, which decides
whether or not to allow private (out-of-plan) provision of health care alongside the NHS, and
the public sector remuneration (wage level). Second, there is a set of physicians determining
their labour supply in the public sector and, if allowed, in the private sector. Finally, there
is a set of individuals demanding medical treatment from the NHS and private (out-of-plan)
providers, if this is an option.
We use the representative consumer approach to characterise the patients’ utility and choice
of health care.7 The utility of the representative consumer corresponds as usually to the ag-
7The representative consumer approach is extensively used in economics. In the health economic literature,
5gregate utility of individuals. For a speciﬁc individual, at a given point of time, the choice
of public and private hospital care is typically a discrete choice (as most other choices). The
representative consumer approach is a simpliﬁed way of aggregating potentially heterogeneous
individuals’ preferences and choices.8
In the case of a private (out-of-plan) option, the representative patient’s utility from medical
treatment is given by the following standard quasi-linear utility function:




X2 + Y 2 +2 bXY
¢
+ Z, (1)
where X and Y are the amounts of public and private health care, respectively, and Z is the
amount of a numeraire good. The parameter b ∈ (0,1) is a measure of the substitutability
between public and private care. A high b reﬂects that public and private health care are close
substitutes, while the opposite is true for a low b.W ei n t e r p r e tb as a measure of the diﬀerences
in service mix or speciality of the public and the private hospital, with a low b reﬂecting a high
degree of diﬀerentiation or specialisation in services and treatments oﬀered. Alternatively, we
may think of b as a measure of the geographical distance between the public and the private
hospital, with a high b reﬂecting close hospital locations (e.g., in the same city).
The optimal consumption choice of the representative consumer is restricted by a budget
constraint. We assume that public (in-plan) health care is free of any charges, while private
(out-of-plan) health care is subject to a charge p>0. Normalising, as usual, the price of the
numeraire good to one, we can write the budget constraint as follows:
m − pY − Z ≥ 0, (2)
where m is the representative consumer’s disposable income. The restriction in (2) says that
consumption expenditures cannot exceed disposable income. Assuming a binding budget con-
straint, we can insert (2) into (1), and rewrite the utility function of the representative patient
as follows:




X2 + Y 2 +2 bXY
¢
− pY + m. (3)
Notably, the utility function is separable in income. Besides income the representative patient’s
there are also several studies employing this approach; see e.g., Rickman and McGuire [13], Ellis and McGuire
[14], Brekke [18], Calem et al. [19], Kesteloot and Voet [20], and Siciliani [21].
8A futher discussion on this issue can be found in, for instance, Anderson et al. [22], which also provide a
formal correspondence between the heterogenous consumer approach and the representative consumer approach.
6utility now consists of the gross utility from receiving public and private health care net of the
expenditures on private health care.
Optimal consumption and demand for public and private health care can now be derived.
Since private (out-of-plan) health care is costly for the patients, while public health care is free
of any charges, it is very likely that public rationing will take place. In deriving the demand,
we therefore assume that the demand for public health care always exceed the public sector
capacity.9 This is well in line with empirical observations from NHS systems.10
In addition, we assume ‘eﬃcient rationing’, which means that the patients with the higher
willingness to pay for health care is taken care of in the public sector.11 Since the utility function,
given by (3), is separable income, the patients’ willingness to pay can be directly interpreted as
reﬂecting the patients’ severity level. Thus, ‘eﬃcient rationing’ by the public sector corresponds
to a situation where the NHS is rationing patients according to severity of illness, leaving the
easier (milder) cases for the private sector.12
Under the assumption of (eﬃcient) public rationing, the private sector demand is obtained
by maximising (3) with respect to Y , yielding the following inverse demand function for private
health care:
p =1− Y − bX. (4)
We see that the (market) price for private health care is decreasing in the overall provision of
health care. This is a standard demand eﬀect simply reﬂecting decreasing marginal utility (or
willingness-to-pay) of consumption. The magnitude of the negative eﬀect of public provision on
the private sector price depends on the degree of substitutability between the two sectors. If b
is small — for instance, due to distant hospital locations or diﬀerent treatment methods — then
a substantial increase in the public provision has only a small negative impact on the price of
private care, and vice versa.
I nt h em a r k e tt h e r ei saﬁnite number of physicians, given by N ≥ 1,q u a l i ﬁed to perform
9In Appendix B, we derive the demand system when public health care is not rationed, and show that non-
rationed demand for public health care always exceed the public sector provision in equilibrium. Thus, demand
for public health care is always rationed in our model.
10According to the extensive literature survey by Cullis et al. [23] rationing by waiting lists for public (in-plan)
care is a common feature of NHS systems.
11An alternative rationing rule is ‘random rationing’, where all consumers have the same probability of being
rationed. For analytical purposes, we have decided to use the eﬃcient rationing rule only, which is also undoubtedly
the most common one in the literature. See Tirole [24] (pp. 212-214) for discussion on various rationing rules.
12This may follow from a strict priority plan enforced by the health authority. Alternatively, it may be the
outcome from the physicians’ (cream-skimming) decisions, see e.g., Gonzalez [16], Olivella [9] and Barros and
Olivella [15].
7hospital treatments. The physicians allocate their time in the public and, if allowed, in the
private sector. We assume, as Ellis and McGuire [14] and several others, that the physicians
earn proﬁts in the private sector, while they are on salary in the public sector, earning the wage
w per unit of labour.13 Normalising, for simplicity, input and output so that one unit of a
physician’s labour supply equals one unit of hospital care, we can write physician i’s utility as
follows:
Vi (X,Y)=wxi + pyi − (xi + yi)
2 ,i =1 ,...,N, (5)
where xi and yi denote the amount of labour supplied by physician i in the public and the
private sector, respectively. While the two ﬁrst terms are public sector income and private
sector proﬁts, respectively, the last term represents the time costs associated with the disutility
of working (measured in monetary terms). We see that the time cost is increasing and convex in
the total amount of labour supply. This can be justiﬁed by a simple opportunity cost argument.
The more time spent at the work place, the higher value of leisure. Moreover, there are physical
limitations to how much one can work each day, implying an individual capacity constraint.
This is captured by the convexity.
Hospital production is labour-intensive, and t h ev a s ta m o u n to ft r e a t m e n t sa r ec a r r i e do u tb y
physicians. Thus, the provision of hospital care is highly sensitive to physicians’ labour supply.
The assumption that one unit of labour equals one unit of hospital care, implies that the total
public and private provision of health care simply are the sums of individual labour supply in








While this clearly is a simpliﬁcation, the results do not rely on this, but only require that there
is a positive relationship between the physicians’ labour supply and the amount of health care
provided.
The interaction between public and private health care provision within a NHS system is
analysed by considering a four-stage game with the following sequence of events:
• Stage 1: The health authority decides whether or not to allow physicians to work in the
13Alternatively, we can, as Rickman and McGuire [13], think of w as a prospective reimbursement, e.g., DRG-
price or fee-for-service. They argue that even though NHS hospitals are prohibited from making proﬁts and
physicians receive a ﬁxed salary, we may link the physicians’ utility to the reimbursement mechanism as long
as the physicians become residual claimant to hospital surplus — through the acquisition of better facilities,
equipment, staﬀ,e t c .
8private sector, i.e., dual practice.
• Stage 2: The health authority determines the public sector remuneration (wage).
• Stage 3: The physicians allocate their time in public sector, and if allowed, in the private
sector.
• Stage 4: Patients receive medical treatment.
The model is, as usual, solved by backward induction.14
3 Physicians’ labour supply
In this section we derive the equilibrium allocation of time by physicians. First, we consider the
benchmark case where physicians are not allowed to work in the private sector. We label this
as the pure public health care system (PS). Second, we derive and characterise the physicians’
labour supply in the public and the private sector when dual practice is allowed. We label this
case as the mixed public-private health care system (MS).
Pure public health care system system
Let us start by analysing the physicians’ allocation of time in the public sector when dual
practice is not allowed, and we have a pure public health care system with no private sector.15




:= w − 2xi =0 (7)






Aggregating each physician’s labour supply, we ﬁnd the following total public provision of






14Note that we keep N ﬁxed throughout the analysis. This can be justiﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a te n t r yi n t ot h ep h y s i -
cian market is highly restricted not only at medical schools but also at the hospital level in terms of specialisation.
Moreover, our interest in N is mainly as a measure of competition in the private sector.
15A ban on dual practice does not neccessarily imply a pure public system. Instead this can induce the physicians
to make a discrete choice between working in the public or the private sector. In our model, this will never be
the case.
9Thus, for any wage above the reservation wage (normalised to zero), the physicians will
provide some public health care. A higher wage increases individual labour supply, resulting
in more patients receiving hospital care in the public sector. Finally, we see that the more
physicians in the public sector, the more patients receive public health care.






which is increasing (and convex) in the public sector wage, and independent of the number of
physicians in the sector. Note also that for any w>0, every physician earns positive proﬁts,
and thus will accept to work in the public sector.
Mixed public-private health care system
Consider now the situation with a private (out-of-plan) option alongside the NHS. In this
case the physicians allocate their work time between the two sectors in order to maximise their




:= w − byi − 2xi − 2yi =0 , (11)
∂Vi
∂yi
:= 1 − 4yi − Y−i − bxi − bX−i − 2xi =0 , (12)
where X−i and Y−i denote the aggregate labour supply in the public and the private sector,
respectively, by all other physicians than physician i.
Comparing (11) with (7) we see that optimal public sector labour supply now depends, not
only on the wage and the marginal costs of time spent in the public sector, but also on the private
sector labour supply. The private option aﬀects public sector labour supply in two ways: First,
since total time spent at providing medical care matters, the allocation in the private sector
must take into account the initial labour supply in the public sector, and vice versa. Second, the
marginal beneﬁt from the public sector not only depends on the wage but also on the private
sector earnings. More precisely, the more patients physician i treats in the public sector, all else
equal, the lower will the price in the private sector be.
10Imposing symmetry, we obtain from (11)-(12) the following individual equilibrium labour
supply in the public and the private sector:16
xMS(w)=
w(3 + N) − 2 − b
2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N
, (13)
yMS(w)=
2 − w(2 + bN)
2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N
, (14)
respectively. Aggregating individual labour supply, we ﬁnd that total equilibrium public and
private health care provision are given by:
XMS(w)=NxMS(w) and Y MS(w)=NyMS(w), (15)
respectively. Inserting (13)-(15) into (4) and (5), we obtain the following private sector price
and individual physician proﬁts in equilibrium:
pMS(w)=
2(1− b)+wN (2 − 3b)




4(1− b) − b2¤
[1 − w(2 + Nb)] + w2Ω
[2(1 + N)(1− b) − b2N]
2 . (17)
where
Ω := 5 − 6b + N
¡
2 − 3b2¢
+ N2 (1 − b)
2 .
Let us start by establishing the conditions for a mixed health care system to occur as an
equilibrium. Observe that the public provision is increasing in w, while the private provision is
decreasing in w. Thus, we can set (13) and (14) equal to zero, and solve with respect to w,t o








We can now establish the following result:
16The equilibrium in (13)-(15) is unique and stable if the determinant of the Jacobian is positive, i.e.,
2(1+N)(1− b) − b





4N +3 N2 +1− N − 1
´
∈ (0.73,0.83).
11Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium with a mixed health care system, where the physi-
cians spend some time in both the public and the private sector, if and only if w ∈ (w,w).
Otherwise, if w ≥ (≤) w, the equilibrium is a pure public (private) health care system, where the
physicians work exclusively in the public (private) sector.
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
Thus, we have mixed public-private health care system if the public sector wage is not
too high nor too low. If the health authority oﬀers a too low wage the physicians will ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to spend their time exclusively in the private sector. On the other hand, if the public
sector wage becomes too high, private provision becomes unproﬁtable, and the physicians work
exclusively in the public sector. Recall that the health authority not only sets the wage, but also
determines whether or not dual practice is allowed. This means that the health authority can
always eliminate the private option for the physicians if this is desirable from a welfare point-
of-view. As will be shown later, it is never optimal for the health authority to close down the
NHS, implying that the pure private health care system never occurs as an equilibrium outcome
of the whole game. Since our focus is on the frequently observed physician dual practice in NHS
systems, we therefore ignore this outcome in the following of this section.
Eﬀects of the public sector wage
Restricting attention to the equilibrium where physicians spend some time in both sectors,
i.e., the mixed health care system, we ﬁrst consider the eﬀect of a higher wage on the physicians’
labour supply, and in turn the provision of health care. By analysing (13)-(15), we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 2 In a mixed health care system, a higher public sector wage induces (i) a shift
in the labour supply from the private to the public sector, with a corresponding increase in the
public provision relative to the private provision; and (ii) an increase in the total provision of
health care.
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
The ﬁrst part of the result is quite intuitive. A higher wage induces the physicians to work
more in the public sector, but at the same time reduce their private sector labour supply. The
reason for the reduction in the private labour supply is two-fold. First, there is a cost eﬀect.
Since the physicians’ disutility of working is increasing in the total time spent at providing care
12— irrespectively of whether this is in the public or private sector — it is optimal for the physicians
to reduce their private sector labour supply in response to the increase in the time spent in the
public sector. Second, there is a revenue eﬀect. The increase in the public provision triggered
by the higher wage will, all else equal, result in a lower price for private treatments, since public
and private care are substitutes. A lower price implies a lower (marginal) revenue from private
provision, which makes it proﬁtable for the physicians to reduce the time spent in the private
sector.
The second part of Proposition 2 is less clear. Since the public provision increases, while
the private provision decreases, in the wage level, the net eﬀect on total health care provision
is in general ambiguous. However, the proposition demonstrates that the positive eﬀect on
public provision of a wage increase always exceed the negative eﬀect on private provision, i.e.,
∂XMS/∂w >
¯ ¯∂Y MS/∂w
¯ ¯. As a consequence, overall health care provision becomes higher
following a public sector wage increase.
T u r n i n gt ot h ew a g ee ﬀects on private sector price and physician proﬁts, we obtain from (16)
and (17) the following result:
Proposition 3 In a mixed health care system, a higher public sector wage increases both the
price of private care and the physicians’ proﬁts if b<2/3.O t h e r w i s e ,i fb>2/3, the price of
private care is decreasing in the wage, and the physicians’ proﬁts are decreasing (increasing) at
low (high) wage levels.
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
These results are rather counter-intuitive and need some explanation. Consider ﬁrst the
public sector wage eﬀect on the private sector price. To identify the countervailing eﬀects, we










We know from Proposition 2 that a higher wage induces an increase in the public provision that
exceeds the decrease in the private provision — i.e., ∂XMS/∂w >
¯ ¯∂Y MS/∂w
¯ ¯ — resulting in a
higher overall health care provision. This suggests that the price of private care should fall as a
response to a higher wage. However, this is not true. The reason is that the impact of public
provision on the price of private care is determined by the degree of substitutability between
public and private care, measured by b. The more diﬀerentiated public and private care are (low
13b) — e.g., due to long distance or diﬀerent service mixes between public and private hospitals —
the less impact has changes in the public provision on the price of private care. In fact, for any
b<2/3,t h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of a lower private provision more than oﬀsets the negative eﬀect of
a higher public provision, resulting in a higher price of private care following a wage increase.
While the wage eﬀect on physician proﬁts is closely connected to the above discussion,
additional eﬀects also enter. To understand the net eﬀect of a wage change on proﬁts, it is

























Disutility / time cost eﬀect
Thus, we see that the wage eﬀect on proﬁts can be decomposed into three eﬀects. First,
there is a public income eﬀect. This is always positive partially because of the higher wage itself,
and partially because of the larger public provision induced by the wage increase. Second, there
is a private proﬁte ﬀect.I fb>2/3, then a higher public sector wage reduces not only the private
sector labour supply, but also the private sector price, implying a negative private proﬁte ﬀect
following a wage increase. However, if b<2/3, then the price of private care is increasing in the
wage, making the wage eﬀect on private proﬁt ambiguous. Finally, there is a time cost eﬀect of
a higher wage associated with the disutility of working. Since the increase in public provision
always exceed the decrease in private provision — i.e., ∂xMS/∂w >
¯ ¯∂yMS/∂w
¯ ¯ —o v e r a l lw o r k i n g
time increases. As a consequence, the time cost eﬀect is unambiguously negative.
Obviously, the net eﬀect of a wage increase on physician proﬁts is determined by the rel-
ative sizes of the three above mentioned eﬀects. As Proposition 3 shows, physicians’ proﬁts
will increase as a response to a higher wage, if public and private health care are suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated, i.e., b<2/3. In this case, the time cost eﬀect is more than oﬀset by the public
and private revenue eﬀects. On the other hand, if b>2/3, the price of private care decreases as
a response to a wage increase, and the private proﬁte ﬀect becomes unambiguously negative. In
this case, the net eﬀect on proﬁt crucially relies on the strength of the public income eﬀect, which
again is depending on the absolute wage level. This explains the last part of the Proposition 3.
Eﬀects of private sector competition (the number of physicians)
14Let us brieﬂy examine how the number of physicians aﬀects the equilibrium outcomes re-
ported above. Analysing (13)-(16), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 In a mixed health care system, a larger number of physicians triggers (i) a lower
price of private care, (ii) a shift in the individual labour supply from the private to the public
sector; (iii) a larger public provision; and (iv) a smaller (larger) private provision when the
number of physicians is high (low).
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
The ﬁrst three eﬀects are quite straightforward. A larger number of physicians, triggers
competition in the private sector, inducing a shift in individual labour supply from the private
sector to the public sector due to lower proﬁtability from private care. Total public health care
provision increases, not only because of the shift in individual labour supply, but also because
of the new physicians spend some time in the public sector.
The fourth eﬀect needs a closer explanation. If we diﬀerentiate the eﬀect of a higher number
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.
Thus, we can decompose the net eﬀect on the private provision into two eﬀects. First, a higher
number of physician increases private provision directly, because every physician works in both
sectors under a mixed health care system. Second, there is a negative competition eﬀect. A
higher number of physicians triggers private sector competition, inducing a shift in the labour
supply from the private sector to the public sector, i.e., ∂yMS/∂N < 0. We see that the
competition eﬀect is stronger the more physicians there are in the market. In fact, when N
becomes suﬃciently high, the competition eﬀe c tm o r et h a no ﬀs e t st h ep o s i t i v ed i r e c tp r o v i s i o n
eﬀect, resulting in a reduction in private provision, as reported in the Proposition.
The scope for a mixed public-private health care system
Let us brieﬂy examine the scope for a mixed health care system. A mixed system requires
that the physicians are active in both sectors, implying that the scope for a mixed system can
be deﬁned by the diﬀerence between the upper and the lower bound on the wage, i.e.,
w − w =
2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N
(2 + bN)(3+N)
. (19)
15Thus, the scope for a mixed system is determined by the degree of substitutability between
public and private health care (b) and the number of physicians in the market (N). From (19),
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 The scope for a mixed health care system is (i) decreasing in the substitutabil-
ity between public and private health care, (ii) and increasing (decreasing) in the number of
physicians if public and private care are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (substitutable).
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition is not very surprising. The closer substitutes public and
private health care are, the less is the scope for a mixed system. The reason is that as b becomes
higher, the more sensitive the price of private care becomes to changes in the public provision.
When b is high, a small increase in the public provision induces a large drop in the price of
private care, which in turn results in a large reduction in the private sector labour supply. In
fact, the physicians’ allocation of time between the two sectors becomes a discrete choice when
b is suﬃciently high. In this case, if the private sector proﬁts exceed the public sector income,
the physician will spend all their time in the private sector, and vice versa.
The second part is less intuitive, and needs some closer explanation. Prima facie one should
expect that a higher number of physicians in the market reduced the scope for a private sector
provision, simply because of stronger price competition and thus less private sector proﬁts. This
is what happens if b is suﬃciently high, as reported in the proposition. However, if b is small,
then the shift-eﬀect in labour supply from private to public provision is weak, implying a larger
scope for a mixed health care system. Technically, it is easy to verify that |∂w/∂N| < (>)
|∂w/∂N| if b is suﬃciently low (high).
Comparison of the pure public system and the mixed public-private system
Before we start analysing optimal policy by the health authority, it is useful to brieﬂyc o n -
trast the pure NHS system with the mixed health care system. A ﬁrst observation is that the
availability of a private option increases the physicians’ reservation wage for working in the
public sector. This follows straightforwardly by the fact that w > 0. By comparing (8)-(9) with
(13)-(15), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 Allowing the physicians to provide (substitutable) private health care, reduces
the public health care provision and also the overall health care provision in the market for any
w ∈ (w,w).
16A proof is provided in Appendix A.
Thus, the proposition shows that allowing publicly employed physicians to oﬀer substitutable
private (out-of-plan) services has a strong crowding out eﬀect — not only on public health care
provision — but in fact also on overall health care provision. Obviously, this means that the
increase in private health care provision — resulting from the private sector option — is smaller
than the corresponding reduction in public health care provision. The intuition is connected to
two countervailing eﬀects. First, there is market power eﬀect. Since the price of private care not
only depends on the private provision, but also on the public provision, the physicians have an
incentive to restrict their labour supply in both sectors in order to obtain higher prices and proﬁts
in the private sector. Second, there is a negative public sector income eﬀect associated with the
reduction in the public sector labour supply, countervailing the former eﬀect. The proposition
demonstrates that the market power eﬀect always dominates the public sector income eﬀect,
implying that overall health care provision becomes lower.
4 The health authority’s wage setting
Let us now turn to stage 2 of the game. At this stage the health authority sets the public sector
wage, anticipating the labour supply responses from the physicians, as described in the previous
section. We assume that the health authority is concerned about social welfare, deﬁned as usual
as the sum of patients’ surplus and providers’ proﬁts net of public transfers (wage expenditures).
The welfare function can be speciﬁed as follows:
W = U + γ
h




where γ is the weight the health authority attaches to physicians’ proﬁts. We ﬁnd it reasonable
that the health authority is more concerned with the patients’ beneﬁt from a medical treatment
than with the physicians’ proﬁts, so we assume that γ<1.
Pure public health care system
First, we derive the optimal public sector wage in a pure NHS system. In this case Y := 0,


















We see that the optimal wage is decreasing in N but increasing in γ. The latter eﬀect is due to
t h ef a c tt h a ta sγ increases, the wage becomes a welfare neutral transfer between the government
and the physicians, eliminating the incentive of keeping public expenditures down.17 The former
eﬀect is due the positive relationship between N and overall public provision. Thus, when N is
high, there is less need to use the wage to induce an optimal level of individual labour supply.
Inserting (22) into (8) and (9), we obtain the following equilibrium labour supply and pro-









As expected, we see that both the individual labour supply and the total public provision are
increasing in γ. This is simply due to the fact a higher γ is equivalent to less concern about public
expenditures, resulting in a higher wage, as explained above. A higher N decreases individual
labour supply, because the optimal wage is decreasing in N.T h i sm a k e st h ee ﬀect of N on total
public provision ambiguous in principle. Taking the partial derivative of (24) with respect to





(4 + N − 2γ)
2 > 0.
Thus, the direct eﬀect of an extra physician in the market always exceed the indirect negative
eﬀect on individual labour supply.
Mixed public and private health care system
Turning to the mixed public-private health care system, welfare can now be written as follows:









17We could of course attach a shadow cost of public funds to the wage expenditures, which would have provided
a separate incentive to keep wage expenditures down, and thus limited the scope for a public sector. However,
since the eﬀect is straightforward and not very interesting, we have decided to leave this out.
18where












is the patients’ gross utility from medical treatment. We see that a high weight on physicians’
proﬁts, γ → 1, implies — on the one hand, a less concern for public and private medical ex-
penditures — but, on the other hand, a larger concern for the physicians’ costs of providing the
treatments. In any case, the patients’ gross utility from public and private health care are left
unaﬀected.
To understand the mechanisms governing the health authority’s wage setting, it is useful to
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Social cost of public and private provision
We see that the optimal wage setting can be decomposed into three elements: First, there
is a direct social gain associated with public provision. This gain is decreasing in the size of
the public and the private sector, simply reﬂecting decreasing marginal beneﬁtf r o mm e d i c a l
treatments. The gain is also decreasing in the wage itself, which can be interpreted as the
marginal cost of public provision.
Second, there are two potentially countervailing private sector eﬀects. On the one hand, a
higher wage reduces private provision, which increases patients’ surplus simply because a larger
fraction of patients receives free public care. On the other hand, a higher wage may increase the
price of private care. In Proposition 3, we showed that this was the case if public and private
care are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, i.e., b<2/3. In this case, the net welfare eﬀect via the private
sector is ambiguous. However, if public and private care are suﬃciently close substitutes, i.e.,
b>2/3, a higher wage not only shifts patients to free public health care, but also reduces the
price for those seeking private care, resulting in an unambiguously positive welfare eﬀect.
Finally, there is a cost eﬀect associated with the provision of health care. Since overall
provision becomes higher following a wage increase — i.e., ∂xMS/∂w >
¯ ¯∂yMS/∂w
¯ ¯ —t h ec o s t
eﬀect is unambiguously negative. We see that if the health authority is not concerned with the
19physicians’ proﬁts, i.e., γ → 0,t h ec o s te ﬀect does not play a role for the optimal wage setting.
The optimal wage is derived by inserting (13)-(16) into (25), and maximising (25) with
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XMS = NxMS and Y MS = NyMS. (29)
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(30)
From these expressions, the following result can be derived:
Proposition 7 The health authority oﬀers a strictly positive wage. The optimal wage results
in a mixed health care system, where the physicians work in both sectors.






[2(1 + N)(1− b) − b2N]
2 < 0,
which is implies that: ∆ := 2(6 − 6b +6 bγ − 5γ)+N
¡










> 0. It can easily be veriﬁed that this condition is always less strict than the equilibrium condition
reported in Footnote 16.
20A proof is provided in Appendix A.
The result may not seem very surprising, but recall that the health authority could induce
a pure private system by setting the public sector wage suﬃciently low, and, vice versa, a pure
public system by setting the wage suﬃciently high. The proposition shows that it is never
optimal for the health authority to eliminate the NHS. If a pure private system is not desirable
at a positive wage, i.e., wMS > 0, it is surely not so at any lower wage, e.g., w =0 .T h u s , a
pure private system is never an equilibrium in this model.
The above proposition also shows that it is not optimal to implement a pure NHS system
by oﬀering so high wages that the physicians will want to exclusively work in the public sector.
However, we cannot rule out that it may be welfare improving to eliminate the physicians’ private
option by banning dual practice. This case will be analysed in Section 5. Before we do this,
we will brieﬂy characterise the equilibrium outcomes under the mixed system. For expositional
purposes, we focus on two special cases: ﬁrst, we assume that γ =0 , and analyse the impact of
the degree of competition (measured by the number of physicians) on the equilibrium outcomes.
Second, we assume b =0 .5, and focus on the role of providers’ surplus (physicians’ proﬁts)
in the objective function (measured by γ) on the wage setting and corresponding equilibrium
outcomes.
T h er o l eo fc o m p e t i t i o na m o n gp h y s i c i a n s
Starting with the case where the health authority is not concerned about physician proﬁts’,
we see from (25) that the health authority’s objective now is to maximise the patients’ gross
health beneﬁt net of private and public health care expenditures. Analysing (26)-(30), under
the assumption of γ =0 , we obtain the following result:
Proposition 8 Ah i g h e rn u m b e ro fp h y s i c i a n si n d u c e s( i )al o w e rp u b l i cs e c t o rw a g e ,( i i )a
lower individual labour supply in both sectors, (iii) a higher provision of health care in both
sectors, and (iv) a lower price of private care, given that γ =0 .
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
Recall from Proposition 4 that — for a given wage w ∈ (w,w) — a higher number of physicians
induced a shift in labour supply from the private to the public sector, resulting in increased
public provision. While eﬀect on private provision was ambiguous, the price of private care
was reduced by the number of physicians in the market. Endogenising the wage setting, the
21above proposition shows that the optimal response for the health authority is to reduce the wage
level as the number of physicians increase. The reason is three-fold. First, since a higher N
increases public provision, there is less need to use the wage to stimulate individual public sector
labour supply to induce optimal levels public care. Second, a higher public provision increases
public expenditures, all else equal, which in turn provides a separate incentive to lower the wage.
Finally, a higher number of physicians triggers private sector competition resulting in a lower
price of private care. Since private medical expenditures also matters for the health authority
(as long as γ<1), the incentive to use the wage to shift patients from the private to the public
sector in order to enhance patients’ surplus is weaker.
T h er o l eo fp h y s i c i a n s ’s u r p l u s( p r o ﬁts)
T u r n i n gt ot h ei s s u eo fh o wt h ew e i g h to np h y s i c i a n s ’p r o ﬁts may aﬀect the optimal wage
setting by the health authority, we assume, for simplicity, that b =0 .5.19 We see from (25) that
when γ>0, the physicians’ costs of providing health care now matters for the wage setting.
Analysing (26)-(30), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 9 A higher weight on the physicians’ proﬁts relative to patients’ surplus in the
health authority’s objective function leads to (i) a higher public sector wage, (ii) a shift from
private to public health care provision, and (iii) a higher price of private care, given that b =0 .5.
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
At ﬁrst glance, this result may seem counterintuitive. However, recall that a higher γ implies
that the health authority is less concerned with both public and private medical expenditures.
In fact, in the extreme case of γ → 1, we see from (25) that the wage expenditures, as well as
the patients’ expenditures on private health care, do not inﬂuence the health authority’s wage
setting. This explains why the public sector wage is increasing in γ. The two last parts of the
proposition follows then straightforwardly. A higher wage induces a shift in individual labour
supply from the private to the public sector, and a corresponding decrease in private provision
and increase in public provision. The price eﬀect follows from the fact that b =0 .5 > 2/3,s e e
Proposition 3.
19It can be shown that the result in Proposition 9 is valid for any b. However, the expressions are very long
and the proof is quite tedious, so we have decided to leave it out. Interested readers may contact the authors for
the proof.
225 The decision on physician dual practice
At stage 1, the health authority decides whether or not to allow for private (out-of-plan) provision
of health care alongside the NHS. In our setting a pure NHS system is equivalent to not allowing
publicly employed physicians to work in the private sector. To make this decision the health
authority needs to compare the welfare level for the two diﬀerent regimes. Inserting (22)-(24)

















By comparing (31) and (32), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 10 A mixed health care system (with physician dual practice) is welfare improving
compared with a pure public health care system if the number of physicians is suﬃciently high
and/or the health authority is suﬃciently concerned about physicians’ proﬁts. Otherwise, a pure
health care system is welfare improving if public and private health care are suﬃciently close
substitutes.
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
Thus, if the number of physicians is suﬃciently high, the health authority should allow
physician dual practice as this would always improve welfare compared with a pure public
system. The reason is that a high number of physicians triggers competition in the private
sector, resulting in low prices of private care. Thus, the welfare loss associated with market
power in the private sector is reduced. In addition, a higher number of physicians makes the
crowding-out eﬀect of dual practice — as shown in Proposition 6 — less severe. Thus, under-supply
of public health care is less a concern.
On the other hand, if the number of physicians in the market is low, the desirability of a
mixed health care system depends on relative sizes of the degree of substitutability between
public and private health care (b) and the weight the health authority attaches to physicians’
proﬁts (γ). Figure 1 below illustrates the relationship for N =2 . We see that the scope
23Figure 1: Welfare eﬀect of physician dual practice; N =2
f o ram i x e dh e a l t hc a r es y s t e mi sd e c r e a s i n gi nb and increasing in γ. The closer substitutes
public and private health care are, the more likely it is that a pure public health care system
is desirable from a welfare point-of-view. The reason is that when the number of physicians is
low and private health care is a close substitute for public health care, then the crowding out
eﬀect very strong. A low number of physicians imply weak competition among the physicians,
and thus high private sector price and proﬁt. In addition, a high b makes the price of private
care very responsive to small changes in the public sector provision. This combination implies a
substantial reduction in public provision following from the possibility of physician dual practice.
Finally, Proposition 10 shows that the desirability of mixed health care system is increasing
in the weight the health authority attaches to physician proﬁts. In the extreme case of γ → 1,
where the health authority puts an equal weight on patients’ surplus and physician proﬁts, the
mixed health care system is always preferable to the pure public system. The reason is that in
this case the level of neither public nor private medical expenditures has no inﬂuence on the
health authority’s choice of health care system. On the other hand, if the health authority puts
a strong emphasis on the public and private medical expenditures, then the scope for a mixed
health care system is reduced.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we have analysed the interaction between public and private health care in a
NHS system where physicians may work in both sectors. We have characterised the physicians’
allocation of eﬀort (number of treatments) between the two sectors, and analysed how this can
24be aﬀected by monetary incentives, as the public sector wage and the private sector price and
proﬁts. Moreover, we have derive the health authority’s optimal public sector wage and analysed
the decision of whether or not to allow private (out-of-plan) provision of health care.
We would like to highlight the following three main ﬁndings of the paper. First, we show
that allowing publicly employed physicians to oﬀer substitutable private (out-of-plan) services
has a strong crowding out eﬀect — not only on public health care provision — but in fact also
on overall health care provision. The reason is that the that physicians can increase the private
sector proﬁts by restricting their labour supply in both sectors. Second, the health authority
can mitigate the crowding out eﬀect by increasing the public sector wage, and will do so if the
number of physicians is small and they put a larger weight on patients’ surplus than physicians’
proﬁts. Finally, we show that a private (out-of-plan) option alongside the NHS is desirable
only if the number of physicians and/or the weight on physicians’ proﬁts is suﬃciently high. A
high number of physicians imply strong private sector competition and makes the crowding-out
eﬀect on public sector less severe. A high weight on physicians’ proﬁts implies less concern for
public and private medical expenditures, which are the main arguments in favour of a pure NHS
system. A pure public system is preferable if these conditions are not fulﬁlled, and, in addition,
the private sector oﬀers suﬃciently diﬀerentiated services to the public sector — interpreted either
in geographical terms or in product space.
Finally, we would like to stress some aspects of our model. First, we have assumed that
the number of physicians is ﬁxed, which can be justiﬁed by the severe restrictions on entry into
the physician market. Free entry is an implausible assumption. On the other hand, we could
of course let the health authority set the number of physicians. In practice, however, entry
is determined by negotiations between the medical association and the health authority, with
obvious conﬂicting interests. Thus, we decided to leave this out of the analysis. Second, the
health authority could in principle regulate the price in the private sector. In this case, the
market power incentives of raising the private sector price and proﬁts would have be eliminated,
which would in turn dampen the crowding out eﬀect of the private option. The eﬀects are,
however, very straightforward. Finally, the production technology is very simple, and some of
the results may rely on this. On the other hand, the crowding out eﬀect and the basic trade-oﬀs
concerning the private sector option are quite general.
257 Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :By inspection of (13)-(15), the following is true:
xMS(w) and XMS(w) > (=)0 iﬀ w>(≤)w,
yMS(w) and Y MS(w) > (=)0 iﬀ w<(≥)w.
It is easily veriﬁed that:
w>w ⇔ 2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N> 0,
which is always true from the condition of equilibrium uniqueness and stability, see Footnote 16.
To prove the existence of a mixed public-private system, we need to verify that the physicians’





2 > 0 and V MS(w)=
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(2 + bN)
2 > 0. (A1)




[2( 1+N)(1− b) − b2N ]
2 > 0, (A2)
which is true since Ω > 0 for any valid parameter values. Thus, V MS(w) is convex function















This completes the proof. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :The ﬁrst part can be shown by taking the partial derivatives of











2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N
< 0. (A6)
Since XMS(w)=NxMS(w) and Y MS(w)=NyMS(w), the result in part (i) is established.




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂yMS
∂w
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ > 0 ⇔ N (1 − b)+1> 0
which is always true. Thus, a higher wage results in a increase in overall provision of health
care, i.e., ∂
¡
XMS + Y MS¢
/∂w > 0. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : Part (i) is established by taking the partial derivative of (16)




N (2 − 3b)
2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N
, (A7)
which is positive only if b<2/3.







4(1− b) − b2¤
(2 + Nb)+2 wΩ
(2(1 + N)(1− b) − b2N)
2 . (A8)




(2(1 + N)(1− b) − b2N)
2 > 0. (A9)
Thus, we know that V MS(w) is a convex function with a unique minimum in w.I tt h e ns u ﬃce
to evaluate (A8) at the lower wage bound, i.e.,
∂V MS
∂w




(N − 1)(2 − 3b)
(N +3 )( 2( 1+N)(1− b) − b2N)
,
which is strictly positive (negative) for any b<(>)2 /3. This completes the proof. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :The comparative statics results are obtained by taking the partial
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[2(1 + N)(1− b) − b2N]
2 < 0, (A12)
where
Γ := 2(1 − b) − b2 − w(2 − 3b). (A13)
To verify part (i) and (ii), it suﬃce to prove that Γ > 0. First, we see that the wage has no eﬀect





' 0.22. Assume then that b<2/3,s o
that Γ is monotonically decreasing in w.I nt h i sc a s e ,i ts u ﬃce to evaluate (A13) at the upper
wage bound, i.e.,
Γ(w)=b
2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N
2+bN
> 0.
Finally, for b>2/3,t h e nΓ is increasing in the wage. In this case, it suﬃce to evaluate (A13)
at the lower wage bound, i.e.,
Γ(w)=
2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N
3+N
> 0.
Part (iii) follows from the fact that XMS = NxMS.D i ﬀerentiating XMS with respect to N






+ xMS > 0,
which is always true since ∂xMS/∂N > 0.







Since ∂yMS/∂N < 0, we know that:
dY MS
dN
< (>)0 iﬀ N
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂yMS
∂N
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ > (<) yMS .
Inserting (A11) and (14), we obtain the following inequality
2NΓ
[2(1 + N)(1− b) − b2N]
2 >
2 − w(2 + bN)
2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N
. (A14)
28First observe that for w = w, the RHS of (A14) becomes zero — i.e., yMS =0—w h i l et h eL H S
is positive, i.e.,
2bN
(Nb+2 )( 2( 1+N)(1− b) − b2N)
> 0.
Thus, for w = w,t h e ndY MS/dN is always negative. However, since yMS is monotonically
decreasing in w, the sign may turn positive. Evaluating the inequality in (A14) for w = w,w e





Since the RHS of (A14) approaches inﬁnity if b → 0, the inequality cannot hold, and the sign of





2bw − 2b2w − 2
√
2bw − 2bw2 − 4b2w + b3w + b4w +5 b2w2 − 3b3w2
−2bw +2 b2w + b3w
.
QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 : The ﬁrst part of the result is obtained by taking the partial
derivative of (19) with respect to b, i.e.,
∂ (w − w)
∂b
= −
6N +4 Nb+2 N2 + N2b2 +4
(Nb+2 )
2 (N +3 )
< 0. (A15)
To prove the second part, we ﬁrst take the partial derivative of (19) with respect to N, i.e.,
∂ (w − w)
∂N
=
8 − 14b + N2b3 − 2bN (N +2 )( 1− b)
(Nb+2 )
2 (N +3 )
2 . (A16)
Setting (A16) equal to zero and solving for N,w ec a ns h o wt h a t
∂ (w − w)
∂N
< (≥)0iﬀ N<(≥) b N :=
4b − 4b2 − 2
√
18b4 +1 2 b3 − 40b2 +1 6 b
2(b3 − 2b +2 b2)
.
It is straightforward to show that b N is decreasing in b,w h i c hv e r i ﬁes part (ii). QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 : To verify the result, we must show that the following is true:
XPS(w) >X MS(w)+Y MS(w).Inserting the expressions from (9) and (15), we can write the
29inequality as follows:
2 − w(2 + Nb)
2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N
> 0
Since the denominator is always positive (see Footnote 16), it remains to check the numerator.
It is straightforward to show that the numerator is zero for w = w := 2/(2 + Nb). Since the
numerator is monotonically decreasing in w, the inequality must be true for any w ∈ (w,w).
This completes the proof. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :We know that ∆ > 0 from the second-order condition (see Foot-
note 16), so it suﬃce to check the sign of the numerators of (26)-(28) to verify the proposition.





14 − 7b − 7b2 − b3¢
+( 1− b)
¡
10 + 2b +4 N2 + N2b
¢
(4 − 4b − b2)(2+Nb)
. (A17)
If b γw / ∈ [0,1], the sign of the numerator is unambiguously positive. We see by inspection that
(A17) is always positive. Thus, it remains to check whether b γw < 1, which is equivalent to
N
¡
14 − 7b − 7b2 − b3¢
+( 1− b)
¡




4 − 4b − b2¢
(2 + Nb).
m
N (1 − b)(4N +3 b + Nb+ 14) + 2 < 0,
which is never true.
To check the sign of xMS,o b s e r v eﬁrst that the only potentially negative term in the numer-
ator of (27) is the last one, which turns negative if b>2/3. In this case, a higher γ will make





(1 − b)+N (2 − b)+γ (2 − 3b)(N − 1)
¤
= N (N +4 )( 1− b)+1> 0.
Thus, xMS is always positive for any valid parameter values.
Finally, we see from (28) that the numerator of yMS is decreasing in b. Thus, it suﬃce to









N2 +5 N − 2Nγ+2− 2γ
¢
− Nb2 (1 − γ)
¤




4N +3 N2 +1+1
´
> 0,
which is always true for any valid parameter value. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 :The result can be veriﬁed by taking the partial derivatives of
(26)-(30) with respect to N. Before we evaluate the expressions recall that the equilibrium









4N +3 N2 +1− N − 1
´
∈ (0.73,0.83).










(4 + b)+2 N3 (1 + b)
¡
14 − 7b − 7b2 − b3¢
(A18)
+N2 ¡
86 + 7b − 74b2 − 24b3 − 2b4¢
+2( 1− b)
¡
21 + 4b +5 2 N +2 8 Nb+4 Nb2¢¤
.
We see that there are two potentially negative terms. Evaluating these, we can show that
¡
86 + 7b − 74b2 − 24b3 − 2b4¢
> 0 for b . 0.97 and
¡
14 − 7b − 7b2 − b3¢
> 0 for b . 0.96.S i n c e
the upper bound b b always ensures that these are true, it follows that ∂wMS/∂N < 0.








N3 (1 − b)(N +2 b + Nb)+N2 ¡




18 − 12b +5 Nb− 6b2¢
+3
¡









N3 (1 + b)
¡
(N + 10)(1 − b) − 2b2¢
+ N2 ¡
35 − 24b − 20b2 − 2b3¢
(A20)
+8N (2 + b)(1− b)+2 8 b − 18],
respectively. It is easily veriﬁed that ∂2xMS/∂N2 < 0 and ∂2yMS/∂N2 < 0.T h u s ,i ts u ﬃce to















44 − 4b − 41b2 − 4b3¢
< 0 if b . 0.95.
Thus, ∂xMS/∂N > 0 and ∂yMS/∂N < 0 are true for any valid parameter values.
Part (iii): Since XMS = NxMS,i tf o l l o w st h a t∂XMS/∂N > 0. The sign of ∂yMS/∂N is,







N4 (1 − b)
¡
5 − 8b +4 b2 + b3¢
+2 N3 (1 − b)
¡
19 − 16b − 4b2¢
(A21)
+N2 ¡
121 − 221b +5 3 b2 +4 2 b3 +6 b4¢
+2 4 N (1 − b)
¡
5 − 5b − b2¢








. Thus, it follows that ∂Y MS/∂N > 0 must be true.
Part (iv): Since both XMS and Y MS are increasing in N,t h e n∂pMS/∂N < 0 must be true.
QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 :The result can be veriﬁed by taking the partial derivatives of





16N +2 0 N2 +5 N3 +8
¢
(3N +4 )
2(16γ − 46N +1 0 Nγ− 22N2 − 3N3 +2 N2γ − 24)






16N +2 0 N2 +5 N3 +8
¢
(N +3 )
(16γ − 46N +1 0 Nγ− 22N2 − 3N3 +2 N2γ − 24)





16N +2 0 N2 +5 N3 +8
¢
(N +4 )
(16γ − 46N +1 0 Nγ− 22N2 − 3N3 +2 N2γ − 24)





16N +2 0 N2 +5 N3 +8
¢
N
(16γ − 46N +1 0 Nγ− 22N2 − 3N3 +2 N2γ − 24)
2 > 0. (A25)













which completes the proof. QED.
32P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0 : Comparing (31)-(32), we can show that WMS >W PS is
equivalent to:
∆W := N3 (1 − b)
2 +2 N2 (1 − b)(2γ − bγ − b) − N (1 − γ)Ψ − 2(1− γ)
2 Φ > 0, (A26)
where
Ψ := 12 − 16γ (1 − b) − 7b2 − 6b + b2γ,
Φ := 2(1 − b)(2− 2γ + b)+b2γ.
From (A26) we see that the ﬁrst term is unambiguously positive. The second term is positive if
γ is suﬃciently high relative to b (i.e., γ>b /(2 − b)), which may or may not be true. The two
last terms are both negative since both Ψ > 0 and Φ > 0. Thus, the inequality surely hold for a








∆W =2 γ3 ¡
4 − 4b − b2¢
− γ2 ¡
40 − 36b − 9b2¢
+4 γ
¡
14 − 11b − 4b2¢
+6 b +1 4 b2 − 19,
which may be positive or negative depending on the combination of parameter values of b and
γ.
Moreover, we see from (A26) that ∆W is increasing in γ. Checking the upper and lower
limit, we can show that:
lim
γ→1
∆W = N2 (1 − b)
2 (N +4 )> 0,
lim
γ→0
∆W = N3 (1 − b)
2 − 2bN2 (1 − b) − N
¡
12 − 6b − 7b2¢
− 4(2+b)(1− b),
where the lower limit is ambiguous. The eﬀect of b upon ∆W is veriﬁed by inspection of (A26),
noting that ∆W<0 at low values of N and γ. QED.
8 Appendix B: Derivation of demand
Let us ﬁrst derive optimal consumption and, thus, demand of hospital care, assuming no binding
capacity constraint in the public sector, despite public health is free of any charges. Maximising
33(3) with respect to X and Y yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
∂U
∂X
:= 1 − X − bY =0 , (B1)
∂U
∂Y
:= 1 − Y − bX − p =0 . (B2)
By solving the set of ﬁrst-order conditions, we derive optimal consumption, and thus the direct
demand functions, of public and private health care:
X∗ =
1 − b + bp
1 − b2 , (B3)
Y ∗ =
1 − b − p
1 − b2 , (B4)
respectively. We see that X∗ >Y∗ for any p>0. Thus, most consumers prefer public health
care simply because of the extra cost associated with the private (out-of-plan) treatment. In
the extreme case of public and private health care being perfect substitutes, i.e., b → 1,t h e n
everybody prefer to be treated at a NHS-hospital.
In the paper, we assume public rationing, i.e., XMS <X ∗. However, since we endogenise
the capacity level of the public sector, we need to check whether this is actually taking place in
equilibrium. Inserting (16) into (B3), we obtain the following condition to be satisﬁed:
XMS <X ∗ ⇔
wN
¡
3 − 2b + N − Nb2¢
− (1 − b)(4N + Nb+2 )
(1 − b2)(2(1+N)(1− b) − b2N)
< 0 (B5)
The denominator is strictly positive by the equilibrium condition reported in Footnote 16. Thus,
it suﬃce to check the sign of the numerator. The last term of the numerator is negative. However,








3 − 2b + N − Nb2¢
− (1 − b)(4N + Nb+2 )
¤
= −
(Nb− N +2 )
£




Thus, public rationing always takes place in equilibrium, i.e., XMS <X ∗ for any w ∈ (w,w).
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